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 Encyclopedia
Judaica 2nd Edition
An essential source of information on
Jewish life, culture, history, and
religion.
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MOSES BEN
MAIMON (print this article)
By : Joseph Jacobs Isaac Broydé Executive
Committee of the Editorial Board. Jacob
Zallel Lauterbach
ARTICLE HEADINGS:
In Egypt.
Philosophical Works.
Philosophy and Religion.
The Divine Attributes.
Motekallamin.
Proofs of the Existence of God.
Aristotelian Principles.
Denies Eternity of Matter.
Reconciliation of Bible and Aristotle.
The Requisites of Prophecy.
Origin of Evil.
God's Providence and Omniscience.
The Object of the Commandments.
Ethical Views.
Objections to the "Moreh."
His Death.
Works on Philosophy and Theology.
Works on Halakah.
Scientific Works.
Correspondence.
Maimonides as Halakist:
Object of the Precepts.
Commentary and Code.
Commentary on the Mishnah.
Practical Purpose.
Attitude Toward Predecessors.
"Sefer ha-Mizwot."
The "Mishneh Torah."
His Sources.
Omissions.
Opposition of RABaD.
Maimonides' Reply.
Influence of the "Yad." |
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 Traditional
Portrait of Moses ben Maimon, with
Autograph.
Talmudist, philosopher, astronomer, and
physician; born at Cordova March 30,
1135; died at Cairo Dec. 13, 1204; known
in Arabic literature as Abu 'Imran Musa
ben Maimun ibn 'Abd Allah. The history
of the "second Moses," as Maimonides
came to be called, is overlaid with
fable. According to some of his
biographers, he evinced in boyhood a
marked disinclination for study. This,
however, is highly improbable, for the
works produced by him in his early
manhood show that their author had not
passed his youth in idleness. Moses ben
Maimon, or Maimonides, received his
rabbinical instruction at the hands of
his father, Maimon, himself a scholar of
high merit, and was placed at an early
age under the guidance of the most
distinguished Arabic masters, who
initiated him in all the branches of the
learning of that time. Moses was only
thirteen years old when Cordova fell
into the hands of the fanatical
Almohades, and Maimon and all his
coreligionists there were compelled to
choose between Islam and exile. Maimon
and his family chose the latter course,
and for twelve years led a nomadic life,
wandering hither and thither in Spain.
In 1160 they settled at Fez, where,
unknown to the authorities, they hoped
to pass as Moslems. This dual life,
however, became increasingly dangerous.
Maimonides' reputation was steadily
growing, and the authorities began to
inquire into the religious disposition
of this highlygifted young man. He was
even charged by an informer with the
crime of having relapsed from Islam,
and, but for the intercession of a
Moslem friend, the poet and theologian
Abu al-'Arab alMu'ishah, he would have
shared the fate of his friend Judah ibn
Shoshan, who had shortly before been
executed on a similar charge. These
circumstances caused the members of
Maimonides' family to leave Fez. In 1165
they embarked, went to Acre, to
Jerusalem, and then to Fostat (Cairo),
where they settled.
In Egypt.
During the first years of his residence
in Egypt Maimonides experienced many
misfortunes. After the death of Maimon,
Moses' brother David supported the
family by trading in precious stones.
David perished at sea, and with him was
lost not only his own fortune, but large
sums that had been entrusted to him by
other traders. These events affected
Maimonides' health, and he went through
a long sickness. Compelled now to work
for a living, and considering it a sin
to earn a livelihood from religion, he
adopted the medical profession. After
several years of practise Maimonides'
authority in medical matters was firmly
established, and he was appointed
private physician to Saladin's vizier
Al-Kadi al-Fad.il al-Baisami, who
recommended him to the royal family and
bestowed upon him many distinctions.
According to the Arabic historian Al-Kitti,
Maimonides declined a similar position
offered to him by "the King of the
Franks in Ascalon" (Richard I. of
England). The method adopted by
Maimonides in his professional practise
was to begin with a simple treatment,
endeavoring to cure by a prescribed diet
before administering drugs. Speaking of
his medical career in a letter addressed
to his pupil Joseph ibn 'Aknin,
Maimonides says: "You know how difficult
this profession is for one who is
conscientious and exact, and who states
only that which he can support by
argument or authority." In another
letter, addressed to Samuel ibn Tibbon,
he describes his arduous professional
duties, which occupy him the whole day
and very often a great part of the
night. Nevertheless, Maimonides'
powerful genius and indefatigable
industry enabled him, amid his numerous
occupations, to produce monumental
works, answer hundreds of questions on
various subjects addressed to him from
various parts of the world, and
administer the affairs of the community
of Cairo, in which, soon after his
arrival, he took a leading part,
apparently becoming its recognized
official head by 1177.
Philosophical Works.
Between the years 1158 and 1190
Maimonides produced, besides several
minor writings (see the list of works
below), a commentary on the Mishnah
entitled "Kitab al-Siraj," a book on the
precepts, "Kitab al-Fara'id.," the code
Mishneh Torah (called by Maimonides'
admirers "Yad ha-Hazakah"), and the
philosophical work "Dalalat al-Ha'irin"
("Moreh Nebukim"). The first three works
are the chief concern of the
supplementary article following, while
here is outlined the philosophical
system expounded in the introductions to
the Mishnah of Pirke Abot and of H.elek,
in the first book of the "Yad ha-Hazakah,"
entitled "Sefer ha-Madda'," and
especially in the "Dalalat al-Ha'irin,"
which became of extraordinary
importance, not only for the rational
development of Judaism, but for the
history of philosophy in the Middle
Ages. The object of the work last
mentioned is explained by Maimonides in
the following terms:
"I have composed this work neither for
the common people, nor for beginners,
nor for those who occupy themselves only
with the Law as it is handed down
without concerning themselves with its
principles. The design of this work is
rather to promote the true understanding
of the real spirit of the Law, to guide
those religious persons who, adhering to
the Torah, have studied philosophy and
are embarrassed by the contradictions
between the teachings of philosophy and
the literal sense of the Torah."
Philosophy and Religion.
According to Maimonides, there is no
contradiction between the truths which
God has revealed and the truths which
the human mind, a power derived from
God, has discovered. In fact, with few
exceptions, all the principles of
metaphysics (and these are, for him,
those of Aristotle as propounded by the
Arabic Peripatetics Al-Farabi and Ibn
Sina) are embodied in Bible and Talmud.
He is firmly convinced that, besides the
written revelation, the great prophets
received orally revelations of a
philosophical character, which were
transmitted by tradition to posterity,
but which were lost in consequence of
the long periods of suffering and
persecution the Jews experienced. The
supposed conflict between religion and
philosophy originated in a
misinterpretation of the
anthropomorphisms and in the superficial
readings of Scripture, which are to the
inner or allegorical interpretations
what silver is to gold. Maimonides'
predecessors, Saadia, Bah.ya, and Judah
ha-Levi, in treating of
anthropomorphism, contented themselves
with the statement that any term under
consideration must be regarded as a
metaphor. Maimonides, however, set up
the incorporeality of God as a dogma,
and placed any person who denied this
doctrine upon a level with an idolater;
he devoted much of the first part of the
"Moreh Nebukim" to the interpretation of
the Biblical anthropomorphisms,
endeavoring to define the meaning of
each and to identify it with some
transcendental metaphysical expression.
Some of them are explained by him as
perfect homonyms, denoting two or more
absolutely distinct things; others, as
imperfect homonyms, employed in some
instances figuratively and in others
homonymously.
The Divine Attributes.
From the anthropomorphisms Maimonides
passes to the much-discussed question of
the divine attributes. As in the case of
the anthropomorphisms, it was, according
to him, the misinterpretation of certain
Biblical passages that caused some to
admit divine attributes. Against this
admission Moses argues (1) that an
attribute expresses some quality or
property which is not inherent in the
object described, in this case being an
"accident," or (2) that it denotes a
property consistent with the essence of
the object described; in the latter case
the fact of the coexistence of such an
attribute would, if applied to God,
denote a plurality in the divine
essence.
(see image) Holograph (?) Draft of the "Dalalat
al-Ha'irin" of Maimonides, Arabic in
Hebrew Characters.(From the Cairo
Genizah.)Maimonides divides all the
positive attributes into five classes:
(1) Those that include all the essential
properties of an object. This class of
attributes can not be applied to God,
because, as all philosophers agree, God
can not be defined, inasmuch as
definition can be established only by
giving genus and differentia. (2) Those
that include only a part of the
essential properties. Neither can these
attributes be applied to God, who, being
incorporeal, has no parts. (3) Those
that indicate a quality. These are also
inapplicable to God, who, having no
soul, is not subject to psychical
analysis. (4) Those that indicate the
relation of one object to another. At
first thought it would seem that this
class of attributes might be employed in
reference to God, because, having no
connection with His essence, they do not
imply any multiplicity or variety in
Him; but on closer examination their
inadmissibility becomes evident. A
relation can be imagined only between
two things of the same species, but not
between two things of different species,
though they may belong to the same
class. For example, between wisdom and
sweetness, meekness and bitterness,
there can be no relation, although in
their general signification they come
under the head of "quality." How, then,
could there be any relation between God
and His creatures, considering the great
difference between them? the creature
having only a possible existence, while
His existence is absolute. (5) Those
that refer to the actions of the object
described. Attributes of this kind,
inasmuch as they are distinct from the
essence of the thing and do not imply
that different elements must be
contained in the substance of the agent,
are most appropriate to the description
of the Creator. Indeed, with the
exception of the Tetragrammaton, all the
divine names are explained by Maimonides
as descriptive of His actions. As to His
essence, the only way to describe it is
negatively. For instance, He is not
non-existent, nor non-eternal, nor
impotent, etc. These assertions do not
involve any incorrect notions or assume
any deficiency, while if positive
essential attributes are admitted it may
be assumed that other things coexisted
with Him from eternity.
Maimonides completes his study of the
attributes by demonstrating that the
philosophical principle that God is the
"intellectus" (), the "ens intelligens"
(), and the "ensintelligibile" (), does
not imply a plurality in His essence,
because in matters of the intellect the
"agens" (which acts in the formation of
the notions), the action, and the object
of the action, are identical. Indeed,
following the theory of Alexander of
Aphrodisias, Maimonides considers that
the intellect is a mere disposition,
receiving notions by impulse from
without, and that consequently ideas are
at the same time subject, action, and
object.
Motekallamin.
The last chapters of the first part of
the "Moreh" are devoted to a criticism
of the theories of the Motekallamin (see
Arabic Philosophy). These theories are
embodied in twelve propositions, from
which they derived seven arguments in
support of the doctrine of "creatio ex
nihilo." This once established, they
asserted, as a logical consequence, that
there is a Creator; then they
demonstrated that this Creator must be
one, and from His unity deduced His
incorporeality. Maimonides exposes the
weakness of these propositions, which he
regards as founded not on a basis of
positive facts, but on mere fiction.
Contrary to the Aristotelian principle
that the whole universe is "one"
organized body, every part of which has
an active, individual relation to the
whole, the Motekallamin deny the
existence of any law, organization, or
unity in the universe. For them the
various parts of the universe are
independent of one another; they all
consist of equal elements; they are not
composed of substance and properties,
but of atoms and accidents (see
Atomism); the law of causality is
ignored; man's actions are not the
result of will and design, but are mere
accidents. Maimonides criticizes
especially the tenth proposition of the
Motekallamin, according to which
everything that is conceivable by
imagination is admissible: e.g., that
the terres-trial globe should become the
all-encompassing sphere, or that this
sphere should become the terres-trial
globe.
Proofs of the Existence of God.
The second part of the "Moreh" opens
with the enumeration of the twenty-six
propositions through which are proved
the existence, the unity, and the
incorporeality of the Primal Cause. For
the existence of the Primal Cause there
are four proofs: (1) no motion can take
place without an agent producing it, and
the series of causes leading to a
certain motion is finite; (2) since some
things both receive and impart motion,
while other things are set in motion
without imparting it, there must exist a
being that imparts motion without being
itself set in motion; (3) as existing
beings are partly permanent and partly
transient, there must be a being whose
existence is permanent; (4) nothing can
pass from a state of potentiality into
that of actuality without the
intervention of an agent; this agent
requires for its own transition from
potentiality to actuality the help of
another agent, and the latter, again, of
another; and so on until one arrives at
an agent that is constant and admits of
no potentiality whatever.
The unity of God is proved by the
following arguments: (1) Two gods can
not be assumed, for they would
necessarily have one element in common
by virtue of which they would be gods,
and another element by which they would
be distinguished from each other;
further, neither of them could have an
independent existence, but both would
themselves have to be created. (2) The
whole existing world is "one" organic
body, the parts of which are
interdependent. The sublunary world is
dependent upon the forces proceeding
from the spheres, so that the whole
universe is a macrocosm, and thus the
effect must be due to one cause. The
incorporeality of God can be proved by
the preceding arguments and by the
principle that every corporeal object
consists of matter and form, and that
every compound requires an agent to
effect its combination.
Aristotelian Principles.
As there is no disagreement between the
principles of Aristotle and the
teachings of Scripture as to God, or the
Primal Cause, so there is none between
their systems of natural philosophy. As
"Primum Motum" of this world there are,
according to Aristotle,the heavenly
spheres, each of which possesses a soul,
the principle of motion, and is endowed
with an intellect. They move in various
senses through unmoved immaterial
beings, or Intelligences, which are the
cause of their existence and their
motion in the best possible way, namely,
a uniform rotary motion. The first
Intelligence, which is the agent of
motion for the uppermost or the
all-encompassing sphere, is a direct
emanation of the Primal Cause; the
others emanated one from the other.
There were altogether nine spheres,
namely, the all-encompassing sphere,
that of the fixed stars, and those of
the seven planets; nine Intelligences
correspond to the nine spheres; a tenth
Intelligence, which is attached to the
lowest sphere, the one nearest to the
center, the sphere of the moon, is the
Active Intellect. This last causes the
transition of man's intellect from a
state of potentiality to that of
actuality.
The earth, which is spherical, reposes
unmoved at the center of the world, and
any changes that happen thereon are due
to the revolutions of the spheres,
which, as animated and intellectual
beings, are acting in full
consciousness. God does not act by means
of direct contact. When, for instance,
He destroys anything with fire, the fire
is set in motion through the movements
of the spheres, and the spheres by the
Intelligences.
All these theories are, according to
Maimonides, supported both by Holy Writ
and by post-Biblical Jewish literature.
That the spheres are animated and
intellectual beings is clearly expressed
by the Psalmist. "The heavens declare
the glory of God" (Ps. xix. 2 [A. V. 1])
can not be taken as a mere figure of
speech. The angels mentioned in the
Bible are identical with the
Intelligences. There is, however, one
point on which Maimonides differs from
his master. According to Aristotle,
these spheres, as well as the
Intelligences, coexisted with the Primal
Cause, while Maimonides holds that the
spheres and the Intelligences were
created by the will of God. Maimonides
asserts that he was prompted to reject
the doctrine of the eternity of matter
not because certain passages in
Scripture confirm the "creatio ex nihilo,"
for such passages could easily be
explained in a manner that would leave
them in harmony with the former
doctrine, but because there are better
arguments for the "creatio ex nihilo"
than for the eternity of the universe.
Denies Eternity of Matter.
Moreover, Aristotle himself was well
aware that he had not proved his thesis.
The adherents of the doctrine of the
eternity of the universe rely on the
following seven arguments, partly
founded on the properties of nature and
partly on those of the Primal Cause: (1)
Motion is eternal, for if it had a
beginning there must have been motion
when it came into existence, because
transition from non-existence to
existence—that is, from potentiality
into actuality—always implies motion.
(2) The first substance underlying the
four elements must be eternal. "To
become" implies taking on form; but
first substance means a formless
substance; hence it has never "become."
(3) As the spheres are indestructible
because they do not contain opposing
elements, which is evidenced by their
circular motion, they must be without a
beginning. (4) Suppose the universe had
a beginning; then either its creation
was possible, or necessary, or its
previous existence was impossible; but
if it was necessary, it could never have
been non-existent; if impossible, it
could never have come into existence;
and if possible, then there must have
been a subject with attributes involving
the possibility. (5) The assumption that
God has produced a thing at a certain
fixed time would imply that He has
changed from the condition of a
potential creator to that of an actual
creator. (6) The supposition that the
world was created would mean that God's
will had undergone a change, or that He
must be imperfect, for either God did
not will previously to create the world,
or, if He did, He had not the power. (7)
The universe being the result of God's
wisdom, it must, like the latter, be
eternal.
Against these arguments Maimonides
argues that though the properties of
nature are thus at present, when the
universe is in actual existence and
fully developed, it does not follow that
things possessed them at the moment when
they were produced; it is even more than
probable that these properties
themselves came into existence from
absolute nonexistence. Still less
conclusive are the arguments based upon
the properties of the Primal Cause, for
it is impossible to obtain a correct
notion of the heavenly spheres and their
Intelligences; the incorrectness of the
views of Aristotle on the subject has
been proved by Ptolemy, although the
system of that astronomer is likewise
far from being faultless.
Reconciliation of Bible and Aristotle.
However, Maimonides is fully aware that
he did not give positive proofs for the
"creatio ex nihilo," and he warns his
pupil Joseph ibn 'Aknin, to whom the "Moreh"
was dedicated, to beware of the opposite
doctrine; for if, as Aristotle taught,
everything in the universe is the result
of fixed laws, if nature does not
change, and if there is nothing
supernatural, it would be absurd to
believe in miracles, in prophecy, and in
revelation. But as Maimonides recognizes
the authority of Aristotle in all
matters concerning the sublunary world,
he proceeds to show that the Biblical
account of the creation of the nether
world is in perfect accord with
Aristotelian views. Explaining its
language as allegorical and the terms
employed as homonyms, he summarizes the
first chapter of Genesis thus: God
created the universe by producing on the
first day the "reshit," or
Intelligences, from which the spheres
derived their existence and motion and
thus became the source of the existence
of the entire universe. This universe
consisted at first of chaos and the four
elements; but, through the influence of
the spheres and more directly through
the action of light and darkness, its
form was developed. In the five
subsequent days came into existence the
minerals, plants, animals, and the
intellectual beings. The seventh day, on
which the universe was for the first
time ruled by the natural laws that
still continue in operation, was blessed
by God, who designed it to proclaim the
"creatio ex nihilo." The account of
Adam's sin is interpreted by Maimonides
as an allegorical exposition of the
relation between sensation,intellect,
and moral faculty; the three sons of
Adam are an allusion to the three
elements in man—the vegetable, the
animal, and the intellectual.
The Requisites of Prophecy.
With the doctrine of "creatio ex nihilo"
prophecy becomes possible; but what are
the requisites of prophecy? Maimonides
cites three different opinions on the
subject: (1) the opinion of those who
believe that any man, whether wise or
stupid, young or old, provided he be to
some extent morally good, can be
inspired by God with the spirit of
prophecy and entrusted with a mission;
(2) the opinion of the philosophers who,
considering prophecy the highest
expression of mental development, assert
that it can be attained by study only;
and (3) his own opinion, which he
considers to be the view of Scripture.
He agrees with the philosophers in
regarding the prophetic faculty as
natural to man and in accordance with
the laws of nature; in holding that any
man whose physical, mental, and moral
faculties are in perfect condition may
become a prophet; but he holds also
that, with all these qualifications, man
may still, by divine, miraculous
interference, be prevented from
prophesying.
The last chapters of the second part of
the work are devoted to the explanation
of the Biblical prophecies and visions,
showing the part taken therein by
imagination, which is, according to
Maimonides, an essential element in
prophecy.
Origin of Evil.
After having given, in the first seven
chapters of the third and last part of
the "Moreh," the exposition of the
vision of Ezekiel, which he explains as
an allegorical description of the
sublunary world, the spheres, and the
Intelligences, Maimonides endeavors to
show that evil has no positive
existence, but is a privation of a
certain capacity and does not proceed
from God; when, therefore, evils are
mentioned in Scripture as sent by God,
the Scriptural expressions must be
explained allegorically. Indeed, says
Maimonides, all existing evils, with the
exception of some which have their
origin in the laws of production and
destruction and which are rather an
expression of God's mercy, since by them
the species are perpetuated, are created
by men themselves.
God's Providence and Omniscience.
The question of evil is closely
connected with that of Divine
Providence. As is well known, Aristotle
asserted that humanity as a whole, but
not the individual, is guided and
protected by Divine Providence. The
reason which led Aristotle to adopt this
view is that Providence implies
omniscience, while, according to him,
God's knowledge is limited to
universals, for if He had knowledge of
particulars He would be subject to
constant changes. Maimonides rejects
this theory and endeavors to show that
belief in God's omniscience is not in
opposition to belief in His unity and
immutability. "God," he says, "perceives
future events before they happen, and
His perception never fails. Therefore no
new ideas can present themselves to Him.
He knows that a certain individual will
be born at a certain time, will exist
for a certain period, and will then
cease to exist. The coming into
existence of this individual is for God
no new fact; nothing has happened that
He was unaware of, for He knew this
individual, such as he now is, before
his birth." As to the objections
advanced by the Peripatetics to the
belief in God's omniscience—namely, that
it is inconceivable that God's essence
should remain indivisible considering
the multiplicity of knowledge of which
it is made up; that His intelligence
should embrace the infinite; that events
should maintain their character of
contingency in spite of the fact that
they are foreseen by the Supreme
Being—these objections, according to
Maimonides, are based on an error.
Misled by the use of the term
"knowledge," men believe that whatever
is requisite for their knowledge is
requisite for God's knowledge also.
The fact is, no comparison whatever is
possible between human knowledge and
God's knowledge, the latter being
absolutely incomprehensible to human
intelligence. But omniscience implies
predestination; how, then, can man's
will assert itself freely? Does not the
very fact of God's knowledge compel man
to act in accordance with it? To refute
this objection Maimonides endeavors to
show that "the fact that God knows
things while they are in a state of
possibility—when their existence belongs
to the future—does not change the nature
of 'possible' in any way; that remains
unchanged; and the knowledge of the
realization of one of several
possibilities does not affect that
realization."
The Object of the Commandments.
The discussion of the question of Divine
Providence is followed by another
question: What is the purpose of the
divine precepts? According to Maimonides,
ethics and religion are indissolubly
linked together, and all the precepts
aim either directly or indirectly at
morality. As in the "Yad ha-Hazakah," he
divides the laws of the Pentateuch into
fourteen groups, and discusses the
principal object of each group and the
special object of each law. Thus, for
instance, the object of the laws
concerning the sacrifices lies in the
accompanying prayers and devotions; as
to the sacrifices themselves, they were
only a concession to the idolatrous
habits of the people.
(see image) Page from the First Edition
of Maimonides' "Moreh Nebukim," Rome
(?), Before 1480.(From the Sulzberger
collection in the Jewish Theological
Seminary of America, New York)As in
metaphysics, Maimonides closely follows
Aristotle's ethical system, which he
expounds in his introduction and
commentary to Abot, in various passages
of the "Sefer ha-Mizwot," and in his "Yad
ha-Hazakah," especially in the "Hilkot
De'ot" and the "Hilkot Teshubah."
According to Maimonides, the final aim
of the creation of this world is man;
that of man is happiness. This happiness
can not consist in the activity which he
has in common with other animals, but in
the exercise of his intellect, which
leads to the cognition of truth. The
highest cognition is that of God and His
unity; consequently the "summum bonum"
is the knowledge of God through
philosophy. The first necessity in the
pursuit of the "summum bonum" is to
subdue sensuality and to render the body
subservient to reason. In order that man
should be considered the aim and end of
the creation of this world he must be
perfect morally and intellectually.
Virtue and vice have their source in the
five faculties of the soul: the
nutritive, the sensitive, the
imaginative, the appetitive, and the
deliberative. The soul is to intellect
what matter is to form: it is
susceptible to both good and evil,
according to the choice made by the
deliberative faculty.
Ethical Views.
Human excellence is either of the
appetitive faculty (moral virtues) or of
the deliberative faculty (intellectual
virtues). The vices of the appetitive
faculty are the opposite of the
appetitive virtues; for instance,
cowardice and rashness are the opposite
extremes of courage, and both are vices.
Virtue is a proficiency in willing what
is approved by reason, developed from
the state of a natural potentiality by
action. The development of virtue
requires exercise and intelligence.
Ethical virtue is that permanent
direction of the will which maintains
the mean of conduct, as determined by
the reason of the intelligent. Courage
is the mean between cowardice and
temerity; temperance, the mean between
inordinate desire and stupid
indifference.
In the field of personal ethics
Maimonides established rules deduced
from the teachings of the Bible and of
the Rabbis. These rules deal with man's
obligations to himself and to his fellow
men. To the former belongs the
obligation to keep oneself in health by
regular living, by seeking medical
advice in sickness, by cleanliness, by
earning a livelihood, etc. The
conditions essential to the soundness of
the soul are contentment, and moderation
in joy and grief. Pity is a generous
quality of the soul; to develop this
sentiment the Law forbade cruelty to
animals. Mutual love and sociability are
necessary to men. The sentiment of
justice prescribed by the Law consists
in respecting the property and honor of
others, even though they be one's
slaves.
Objections to the "Moreh."
The "Moreh" was completed by Maimonides
at the age of fifty-two. It was the
climax of his literary career in the
field of Judaism. After having in his
previous works systematized all the
Biblical and rabbinical laws and
ceremonies and drawn up the thirteen
Articles of Faith in which every
Israelite is bound to believe, he shows,
in the "Moreh," that Judaism is the very
expression of human intelligence and
that there is nothing in Scripture or
rabbinical literature, if properly
explained, that contradicts true
philosophy. As might be expected, the
adversaries of Maimonides' code declared
war against the "Moreh." His views
concerning angels, prophecy, and
miracles, and especially his assertion
that he would have had no difficulty in
reconciling the Biblical account of the
Creation with the doctrine of the
eternity of the universe, had the
Aristotelian proofs for it been
conclusive, provoked the indignation of
the orthodox. Maimonides' theory of the
unity of souls (comp. Alexander of
Aphrodisias) was declared by them to be
an outright denial of the immortality of
the soul.
Maimonides disdained these attacks and
continued his laborious life, enriching
medical literature with some valuable
works and enlightening his admirers and
disciples upon a multitude of questions.
Among these was an inquiry concerning
astrology, addressed to him from
Marseilles. In his answer Maimonides
says that, in his opinion, man should
believe only what can be supported
either by rational proof, by the
evidence of the senses, or by
trustworthy authority. He affirms that
he has studied astrology and that it
does not deserve to be described as a
science. The supposition that the fate
of a man could be dependent upon the
constellations is ridiculed by him; he
argues that such a theory would rob life
of purpose and would make man a slave of
destiny.
With the completion of the "Moreh,"
Maimonides was at the zenith of his
glory. He had the satisfaction of seeing
his work translated into Hebrew and
received with great admiration by
enlightened Jews; even Mohammedans
studied it and admired the genius of its
author. The renowned Arabic physician
and theologian 'Abd al-Latif of Bagdad
confessed that his wish to visit Cairo
was prompted by the desire to make the
acquaintance of three men, among whom
was Musa ibn Maimun. The latter's
greatness as a physician was no less
recognized, and the Arabic poet and cadi
Al-Sa'id ibn Surat al-Mulk sang it in
ecstatic verse, which, translated into
English, reads as follows:
Galen's art heals only the body, But Abu
Imram's [Maimonides'] the body and the
soul. With his wisdom he could heal the
sickness of ignorance. If the moon would
submit to his art, He would deliver her
of her spots at the time of full moon,
Cure her of her periodic defects, And at
the time of her conjunction save her
from waning.
His Death.
The last years of Maimonides' life were
marked by increasing physical ailments;
he died in his seventieth year, mourned
by many congregations in various parts
of the world. In Fostat both Jews and
Mohammedans observed public mourning for
three days. In Jerusalem a general fast
was appointed; a portion of the "TokaHah"
was read, and the history of the capture
of the Ark of the Covenant by the
Philistines. His body was taken to
Tiberias, and his tomb became a place of
pilgrimage.
With the death of Maimonides the "Moreh"
became the occasion for a long and
bitter fight between conservative and
liberal Jews in France and Spain. So
bitter, indeed, was the contest that
fierce invectives were speedily followed
by anathemas and counter-anathemas,
issued from both camps. Finally, about
1234, the dispute was referred to the
Christian authorities, who ordered
Maimonides' works to be burned. However,
in spite of the strenuous opposition of
the orthodox, perhaps because of this
opposition, the "Moreh" became the
"guide" of enlightened Jews for many
generations, and its study produced
philosophers like Spinoza, Solomon
Maimon, and Moses Mendelssohn. Nor was
its fame confined to the narrow pale of
Judaism; as early as the thirteenth
century portions of it were translated
into Latin, and many Christian
scholastics, like Albertus Magnus, Duns
Scotus, Alexander of Hales, etc., drew
from this inexhaustible well of
learning.
The following is a classified list of
Maimonides' works:
Works on Philosophy and Theology.
Philosophy and Theology: "Dalalat al-Ha'irin."
Translated into Hebrew by Samuel ibn
Tibbon, in 1204, under the title "Moreh
Nebukim."The Hebrew translation was
first published somewhere in Italy
before 1480; since then it has been
frequently published with commentaries.
Another Hebrew translation, by Al-Harizi,
was published by Schlossberg (vol. i.,
London, 1851; vols. ii. and iii.,
Vienna, 1874 and 1879). There are two
Latin translations of the "Moreh," by
Aug. Justinianus (Paris, 1520) and by
Buxtorf, Junior (Basel, 1629); the
earlier is based on the Hebrew version
of Al-Harizi and is a mere copy of an
older Latin translation; the later is
based on that of Ibn Tibbon. The Arabic
original, with a French translation
entitled "Guide des Egarés," was
published by Salomon Munk (3 vols.,
Paris, 1856-66). The work was translated
twice into Italian, by Jedidiah ben
Moses of Recanati (1580) and by D. J.
Maroni (1870). The first part was
translated into German by Fürstenthal (Krotoschin,
1839); the second, by M. E. Stein
(Vienna, 1864); and the third, by
Scheyer (Frankfort-on-the-Main, 1838).
Part iii. was translated into English,
under the title "The Reasons of the Laws
of Moses," by Townley (London, 1827). A
complete English translation, in three
volumes, was published by M. Friedländer
(London, 1889).
"Makalah fi-S.ina'at al-Mantik," on the
terminology of logic, in fourteen
chapters; written at the age of sixteen.
It was translated into Hebrew by Moses
ibn Tibbon under the title "Millot ha-Higgayon,"
and was first published, with two
anonymous commentaries, at Venice in
1552; it has since passed through
fourteen editions. A Latin translation
was published by Sebastian Münster
(Basel, 1527); German translations were
made by M. S. Neumann (Venice, 1822) and
Heilberg (Breslau, 1828). Among the
numerous commentaries written on this
work the most noteworthy is that of
Moses Mendelssohn.
"Makalah fi al-Tauh.id," an essay on the
unity of God. Translated into Hebrew by
Isaac ben Nathan, in the fourteenth
century, under the title "Ma'amar ha-Yih.ud."
"Makalah fi al-Sa'adah," an essay, in
two chapters, on felicity (Paris,
Bibliothèque Nationale, No. 7193).
Published for the first time in Hebrew,
under the title "Perakim be-Hazlahah,"
in 1567.
An essay on forced conversions.
Translated anonymously into Hebrew under
the title "Iggeret ha-Shemad," or "Ma'amar
Kiddush ha-Shem." It sets forth (1) the
extent to which a Jew may yield and the
extent to which he must resist when
under compulsion to embrace another
religion, and maintains (2) that
Mohammedanism is not a heathenish
religion. Maimonides wrote this essay in
reply to a certain rabbi who asserted
that compulsory converts to Islam,
though they may secretly observe all the
Jewish precepts, can not be considered
as Israelites. It is generally held that
in this case Maimonides preached "pro
domo sua," he and his family having been
themselves forced to embrace Islam.
This, however, is contested by some
scholars, who, on very good grounds,
even doubt Maimonides' authorship of
this essay. The "Iggeret ha-Shemad" was
published by A. Geiger in his monograph
on Maimonides (Breslau, 1850).
Letter to Rabbi Jacob al-Fayyumi, on the
critical condition of the Jews in Yemen
(1172). It was translated into Hebrew by
Samuel ibn Tibbon, Abraham ibn H.isdai,
and Nathan ha-Ma'arabi. Ibn Tibbon's
translation was published under the
title of "Iggeret Teman" (Vienna, 1857);
that of Nathan ha-Ma'arabi, under the
title "Petah. Tikwah" (1629); that of
Abraham ibn H.isdai is still extant in
manuscript.
An essay on resurrection. Translated
into Hebrew by Samuel ibn Tibbon and
published under the title "Ma'amar
Teh.iyyot ha-Metim" (1629). A Latin
translation, still extant in manuscript,
was made by Mithridates.
Works on Halakah.
Halakah: Commentaries on the Mishnah,
entitled "Kitab al-Siraj." They were
translated into Hebrew by several
scholars: on Berakot, Peah, Demai,
Shebu'ot, by Judah al-Harizi; the
remainder of Seder Zera'im and Seder
Mo'ed, by Joseph ben Isaac ibn al-Fu'al;
Seder Nashim, by Jacob ben Moses of
Huesca; Seder Nezikin—with the exception
of Abot, which was translated by Samuel
ibn Tibbon—by Solomon ben Jacob of
Saragossa; Seder Kodashim, by Nethaneel
ben Joseph of Saragossa; Seder Tohorot,
by an anonymous scholar; various other
parts, by Israel Israeli. The Hebrew
translations were first published at
Naples (1492). Of the original were
published: the general introduction and
the prefaces to seder v. and vi., and to
the treatise Menah.ot, with a Latin
translation by Pococke (Oxford, 1654);
the introduction to Abot ("Shemonah
Perakim"), with a German translation by
M. Wolf (Leipsic, 1863); the Seder
Tohorot, with a Hebrew translation by
Joseph Derenbourg (Berlin, 1886-92);
various treatises, some with Hebrew and
some with German translations, published
as university dissertations in the last
twenty years. The Hebrew translations
were rendered into Latin by Surenhusius;
into Spanish by Reuben ben Nah.man Abi
Saglo.
"Kitab al-Fara'id.." Twice translated
into Hebrew, first by Moses ibn Tibbon,
and then by Solomon ben Joseph ibn Ayyub.
Ibn Tibbon's translation was printed
first in Italy and then in Lisbon in
1497, and frequently since. Part of the
original, with a German translation, was
published by M. Peritz (Breslau, 1882),
and a complete edition, with a French
translation entitled "Le Livre des
Préceptes," by Moses Bloch (Paris,
1888).
Commentary on H.ullin and on nearly all
of three sections—Mo'ed, Nashim, and
Nezikin. Of these commentaries, which
Maimonides cites in the introduction to
the Mishnah, only that on Rosh ha-Shanah
is known; it was edited by J. Brill in
the periodical "Ha-Lebanon" (viii. 199
et seq.).
"Mishneh Torah," or "Yad ha-Hazakah."
The earliest edition appeared in Italy
about 1480; the second at Soncino, 1490;
the third at Constantinople, 1509; the
fourth, fifth, sixth, and seventh
editions at Venice, 1524, 1550, 1550-51,
and 1574-75; the eighth at Amsterdam,
1702-3; the most recent and complete
edition is that of Leipsic, 1862. Parts
of an Arabic translation of the "Mishneh
Torah" and an Arabic commentary on the
"Sefer ha-Madda'" are still extant in
manuscript. Extracts from the "Mishneh
Torah" were translated intoEnglish by H.
Bernard and E. Soloweyczik (London,
1863).
Halakot, extracted from the Talmud of
Jerusalem; cited by Maimonides in his
commentary on Tamid (v., infra).
Scientific Works.
Astronomy and Medicine: An essay on the
Jewish calendar, based on astronomical
principles. It is divided into two
parts: on the "Molad" (conjunction of
the moon), and on the "Tekufah" (seasons
of the year). It was translated into
Hebrew by an anonymous writer and was
inserted in the "Dibre Hakamim" of
Eliezer of Tunis (Metz, 1849), and also
in "Kobez. Teshubot Rambam" (Leipsic,
1859).
"Fi al-Jama'ah," on sexual intercourse,
in three parts, dedicated to Malik al-Mustafir,
Sultan of Hamat and nephew of Saladin.
It was twice translated into Hebrew:
under the title "Ma'amar 'al Ribbui ha-Tashmish,"
by Zerahiah ben Isaac, and under the
title "Ma'amar ha-Mashgel" (anonymous).
Both original and translations, as well
as a Latin version, are extant in
various manuscripts.
"Al-Sumum wal-Mutaharriz Min al-Adwiyyah
al-Kitalah" (also called "Al-Makalah al-Fad.iliyyah"),
on various poisons and their antidotes,
in two volumes. Translated into Hebrew,
under the title "Ha-Ma'amar ha-Nikbad,"
or "Ha-Ma'amar be-Teri'ak," by Moses ibn
Tibbon; extant in various manuscripts. A
Latin translation of this work was made
by Armengaud Blasius of Montpellier. A
French translation from the Hebrew
version was made by M. Rabbinowicz under
the title "Traité des Poisons" (Paris,
1865), and a German translation by M.
Steinschneider entitled "Gifte und Ihre
Heilungen" (Berlin, 1873).
"Fi al-Bawas.ir," on hemorrhoids, in
seven chapters. Translated into Hebrew
under the title "Ha-Ma'amar bi-Refu'at
ha-Tehorim," and into Spanish under the
title "Sobre los Milagros." Original and
translations are found in manuscript.
"Fus.ul Musa," an imitation of the
aphorisms of Hippocrates. Translated
into Hebrew by Zerahiah ben Isaac and by
Nathan ha-Me'ati ("Pirke Mosheh,"
Lemberg, 1804; Wilna, 1888). A Latin
translation was published in 1489.
"Makalah fi al-Rabw," on asthma.
Translated into Hebrew by Samuel ben
Benveniste and Joseph Shatibi.
Commentary on Hippocrates' aphorisms.
Extracted from the commentary of Galen;
translated into Hebrew by Moses ibn
Tibbon and anonymously.
Essays on hygiene, or consultations with
Malik al-Fad.l, son of Saladin.
Translated into Hebrew by Moses ibn
Tibbon, and published first in "Kerem
H.emed" (iii. 9-31), and later by Jacob
Safir ha-Levi (Jerusalem, 1885). A Latin
translation was published at Venice
(1514, 1518, 1521) and Leyden (1531).
Another Latin translation was made from
the Hebrew by John of Capua; a German
translation was published by D.
Winternitz (Venice, 1843).
"Makalah fi Biyan al-A'rad.," on the
case of the Prince of Rikka. Translated
into Hebrew anonymously under the title
"Teshubot 'al She'elot Peratiyyot." A
Latin translation was published in 1519
under the title "De Causis Accidentium
Apparentium."
Correspondence.
Maimonides' correspondence and some
consultations appeared at first without
place or date, and later, under the
title "Teshubot She'elot we-Iggarot," at
Constantinople (1520). His responsa were
translated from the Arabic into Hebrew
by Mordecai Tammah, and published at
Amsterdam, 1765, under the title "Pe'er
ha-Dor," and at Leipsic, 1859, under the
title "Kobez. Teshubot Rambam."
Bibliography: Modern: Peter Beer, Leben
und Wirken des Maimonides, Prague, 1834;
Geiger, Jüd. Zeit. i. 97 et seq.;
idem, Moses ben Maimon, Breslau, 1850;
Jost, Annalen, 1839, pp. 308 et seq.;
1840, pp. 32 et seq.;
idem. Allg. Gesch. iv. 116 et seq.;
idem, Gesch. des Judenthums, ii. 430 et
seq.;
Munk, Notice sur Joseph ben Jahoudah,
Paris, 1842;
idem, in Arch. Isr. 1851, pp. 319 et
seq.;
Bukofzer, Maimonides im Kampf mit Seinen
Neuesten Biographen, Berlin, 1844;
F. Lebrecht, Ueber die Apostasie des
Maimonides, in Magazin für Literatur des
In-und Auslandes, 1844, No. 62;
A. Baruch, Two Lectures on the Life and
Writings of Maimonides, London, 1847;
Wüstenfeld, Gesch. der Arabischen Aerzte,
p. 110;
Carmoly, Histoire des Médecins, p. 52;
Steinschneider, Cat. Bodl. cols.
1861-1942;
idem, Hebr. Uebers. passim;
idem, Die Arabische Literatur der Juden,
§ 158;
idem, Sammlung Gedichten über Maimonides,
in Kobez. al-Yad, Berlin, 1885 and 1886;
Weiss, Bet Talmud, i., No. 6;
Scheyer, Das Psychologische System des
Maimonides, Frankfort-on-the-Main, 1845;
Joël, Die Religionsphilosophie des Moses
ben Maimon, Breslau, 1876;
Kaufmann, Die Attributenlehre, passim;
idem, Zur Biographie Maimonides, in
Monatsschrift, 1896, p. 460;
M. Friedländer, Introduction to the
Guide of the Perplexed;
Hermann Kahan, Hat Maimonides dem
Krypto-Mohammedanismus Gehuldigt? 1899;
Berliner, Zur Ehrenrettung des
Maimonides, in Israelitische
Monotsschrift, 1901, No. 6;
J. Friedländer, Der Arabische
Sprachgebrauch des Maimonides,
Frankfort-on-the-Main, 1902;
Abrahams, Maimonides, Philadelphia,
1903;
Grätz, Gesch. vi. 310.J. I. Br.
Maimonides as Halakist:
Object of the Precepts.
The fundamental purpose of all the
halakic works of Maimonides was to bring
system and order into the tremendous
mass of traditional law and to promote
the knowledge thereof by presenting it
in a comparatively clear and brief form.
This self-imposed task was the necessary
consequence of his views regarding the
mission and the purpose of the Jews and
their relation to the revealed law; for
in his eyes the Law, which the Jew was
bound to follow, was not confined to the
written code, but, in accordance with
the traditional view (see Oral Law)
adopted by Maimonides, embraced oral
explanations, regulations, and
provisions that had been given to Moses.
These precepts and regulations were of
equal validity with the written law, as
were all those which scholars had
deduced from the Bible by rules of logic
or hermeneutics. There were, moreover,
precepts set forth by prophets and sages
which had no connection with the written
law, although they were accepted by the
entire people and were obligatory
(Commentary on the Mishnah,
Introduction). A necessary condition for
the observance of the Law was a
knowledge of it, and the Jew was obliged
to enter upon scientific studies that he
might rightly understand the truths
contained in the Torah and attain
spiritual perfection; thus he was unable
to devote his entire time to the
investigation of the commandments of the
Law.
A fixed code, therefore, became
necessary if each man was to know the
Law and its precepts, and in it the
rules and regulations must be contained
with pregnant brevity. The Mishnah of
Judah ha-Nasihad once been such a code,
but it then had no commentary, and the
Talmud, designed to fill this want, fell
short of its object. The treatment of
the Mishnah in the Talmud was often
unintelligible, as when it asserted that
a given mishnah contained this or that
when such was not stated in the Mishnah
itself, or that one mishnah was
incomplete, while another required
correction. Nor was the general plan of
the Talmud as a commentary satisfactory,
for it frequently explained a mishnah by
discussions which were too detailed and
too involved, while the language
employed was unintelligible to the
majority. It was often impossible to
interpret a mishnah except by statements
scattered through two or more treatises,
so that a thorough knowledge of the
entire Talmud, which few could attain,
was necessary to determine the exact
ruling of the mishnah in practical
matters. It was impossible, moreover, to
regard even the mishnaic code as
complete, since it did not contain the
many rules and regulations which were
developed and elaborated in the later
Talmudic period; and the Jewish people
consequently lacked the body of law
which was so requisite (Letter to Ibn 'Aknin,
in the collection of responsa and
letters of Maimonides, p. 30b, Leipsic,
1859).
Commentary and Code.
Maimonides set himself the task of
meeting this want. This he sought to do
by commenting on the Mishnah and making
it available as a code, from which
decisions of practical bearing might be
deduced without the necessity of working
through many involved disquisitions
(Introduction). He planned also a new
and more comprehensive body of law
which, based upon the written Torah,
should contain all that a faithful Jew
must know, so that he need not spend his
entire time in Talmudic controversies
and disputations (Letter to Ibn 'Aknin,
l.c. p. 31b). The two methods of
commentary and codification were, in the
opinion of Maimonides, the only ones
open to every author to follow, the
model of the one being the Talmud and of
the other the Mishnah (Responsa, No.
140, Leipsic, 1859). It thus becomes
possible to distinguish between the
commentatorial and the codificatory
contributions of Maimonides to the
religious law.
Commentary on the Mishnah.
Commentatorial Activity: In a survey of
the activity of Maimonides as a
commentator only his gloss on the
Mishnah comes under consideration, for
while it is true that Maimonides wrote
commentaries on the Talmud, especially
on the three orders of Mo'ed, Nashim,
and Nezikin, as well as on the treatise
H.ullin (Introduction), they have all
been lost, while the gloss on Rosh ha-Shanah
(ed. Brill, Paris, 1865) is of doubtful
authenticity. These are of importance in
this connection only in so far as it
must be assumed that many decisions in
the works of Maimonides that apparently
contradict the meaning of the Talmud
were probably based on divergent
interpretations which he had adopted in
his lost Talmudic treatises. Very
different is it with his commentary on
the Mishnah, which has been preserved in
its entirety, and in which may be seen
the combination of gigantic plan and
detailed method that Maimonides adopted.
In his mishnaic gloss Maimonides was for
the most part a commentator, seeking to
expound the Mishnah to those who studied
it and giving them the general rules by
which they might understand its true
meaning. These principles, which afford
a correct interpretation of many
passages of the Mishnah, are scattered
through his commentary, and he urges the
reader to impress them on his memory
that there may be no need of repeating
them (Commentary on the Mishnah, B. B.
v. 2 and Nazir ix.).
The gloss itself was designed to enable
the layman to understand the Mishnah,
since he could not work through the
involved disquisitions of the Talmud,
and was in many cases unable even to
understand the language (comp. "Yad,"
Preface). And even Talmudic scholars
might receive great aid from the
commentary, since it removed the
difficulties of many mishnaic passages
and explained them correctly; for
numerous passages in the Mishnah were
not understood even by the Geonim and
leading authorities (Commentary on the
Mishnah, 'Ab. Zarah v. 8 and Ket. i. 6).
The entire mishnaic order Kodashim was
unintelligible alike to scholars and
laymen, since the great majority had
little knowledge of the laws relating to
sacrifice, so that his commentary on
this portion of the Mishnah was designed
to be of assistance to teacher and pupil
alike (Introduction to Kodashim). In
addition to this purely commentatorial
service, the gloss was designed to give
rulings in religious law of practical
importance, which the layman would be
entirely unable to deduce from the
Talmud, while even to an expert their
deduction would be difficult and
precarious. After Maimonides'
explanation of the meaning of each
mishnaic passage, therefore, he states
how the practical halakic decision is
determined.
Practical Purpose.
Wishing his commentary to serve for
instruction both in religious and in
moral matters, he frequently omitted a
detailed discussion of the view of a
tanna where it was not accepted
practically (comp. Frankel, "Hodegetica,"
p. 324). He did not limit himself,
consequently, to an explanation of the
Mishnah and a statement of the
definitive halakic decisions, but rather
seized every opportunity to expose
abuses, superstitions, and errors, even
in cases where his remarks have only a
slight connection with the content of
the Mishnah, or, indeed, none at all
(comp. his polemic against those who
wrote amulets, in the Commentary on the
Mishnah, Sotah vii. 8, and against those
who used learning as a means of gain, ib.
Ned. iv. 3 and Bek iv. 6).
In the majority of cases Maimonides gave
the Talmudic interpretation of a mishnah
with the omission of all subtle
explanations and disquisitions, and to
that extent his commentary serves as an
introduction to the Talmud, inasmuch as,
after the reader or the student has
acquired, with the help of this gloss, a
knowledge of the Mishnah and is
acquainted with the results of Talmudic
exposition contained in it, he is able
successfully to venture on the sea of
the Talmud itself (Introduction). He did
not, however, follow Talmudic
interpretations everywhere, for in many
places where the mishnaic exegesis of
the Talmud did not seem to him tobe
correct, regardless of its authority he
stated his own views (comp. Schorr in
"He-Haluz," 1860, v. 43-49). This he did
even in cases where another view of the
Halakah as regards practical decisions
resulted from his interpretation (Schorr,
ib.; comp. Lipmann Heller, "Tosafot Yom-Tob,"
on Naz. iv. 4 and Sheb. iv. 10). In
passages in which the Talmud gave two
contradictory mishnaic explanations, one
of which was received as valid for a
halakic decision while the other was
rejected, he, apparently, did not
hesitate to accept the latter (comp. his
interpretation of B. K. x. 8 and Gemara
ib.).
Attitude Toward Predecessors.
Maimonides likewise employed the works
of his predecessors, although he cited
them but seldom, since he deemed it
superfluous to mention the name of his
authority in every instance. Thus he
says in the preface to the eight
chapters which he prefixed to his
commentary on Abot: "I have not invented
this explanation, or myself framed these
assertions, but I have taken them from
the words of the wise and gathered them
from the works of others. Though I do
not name them, I do not claim, by my
silence, the learning of others as my
own, for I have just admitted that much
is taken from other sources." He was,
however, entirely independent with
regard to his precursors, and he
frequently refuted the explanations of
the Geonim, stating in the letter to 'Aknin
(p. 3lb) that many errors in his
commentary were due to his adherence to
his predecessors, including Rabbi Nissim.
Maimonides interpreted the language of
the Mishnah according to the rules of
Hebrew and Aramaic grammar, and employed
the "'Aruk" in his explanations of
words, although he often fell into the
error of regarding Greek loan-words in
the Mishnah as Hebrew and explaining
them accordingly (comp. Weiss, "Mishpat
Leshon ha-Mishnah," p. 11, Vienna,
1867). Toward a better interpretation,
he frequently cited the principles of
other sciences, such as mathematics and
physics, while he attained his object of
bringing system and order into the mass
of tradition by detailing, before each
important discussion, the general
principles upon which it rested.
Maimonides provided several treatises
and orders with prefaces, and prefixed
to his entire commentary a general
introduction, in which he discussed the
origin, plan, and arrangement of the
Mishnah and gave an account of the
transmission of the oral law. In this
introduction and in his preface to the "Yad,"
as well as in his letters and in
numerous scattered notes in his
commentary, Maimonides gave coherent and
comprehensive information regarding the
origin of the Mishnah, the Tosefta, the
halakic midrashim, and both Talmuds, in
which he evinced a knowledge of literary
history superior to that of all his
predecessors.
As a commentator Maimonides attained but
half his aim, although he had reduced
his interpretation of the halakic code
to the smallest possible compass. He
was, therefore, obliged to plan a new
and more comprehensive system of law. It
was by no means necessary, however, in
his opinion, that this should follow the
older mishnaic code; it should rather be
arranged according to its
subject-matter. All legal regulations,
consequently, were to be divided into
groups, but before the precepts could be
classified it was necessary to enumerate
them and to determine what regulations
were to be considered as commandments.
Many a passage in the Torah which is a
commandment or a prohibition in form is
not one in reality. Some ordinances,
Maimonides declared, are mere
foundations for other laws and can not
be regarded as independent.
"Sefer ha-Mizwot."
In the enumeration of all the
commandments of the Torah, which,
according to tradition, numbered 613,
great confusion existed before the time
of Maimonides, since no principle of
classification was established, and
consequently the various systems
conflicted in many respects. As a sort
of introduction to his new code,
Maimonides prefixed to it a work
containing a dry list of all the
commandments of the Torah. In the "Sefer
ha-Mizwot" he systematized the
commandments by deducing them from
fourteen self-evident principles,
enumerating the 613 commandments on this
basis. This work was generally accepted,
and formed the foundation of the
majority of subsequent lists. It must be
admitted, however, that Maimonides
himself frequently deviated from his own
rule and cited individual commandments
which, according to his system, could
not be regarded as precepts, a point to
which attention was called as early as
the time of Nah.manides (Weiss, l.c. pp.
197-199). See Commandments, The 613.
Codificatory Activity: After
establishing the list of all the
injunctions of the Torah in his "Sefer
ha-Mizwot," Maimonides proceeded to
write his great work, the "Mishneh
Torah," on which he labored for ten
successive years. In this book he
planned a complete legal system which
should give in a brief but clear form
the final decision in the case of each
law, so that, by the omission of long
discussions and demonstrations, every
regulation, law, and custom of religious
life might be learned without any other
manual. He named the work, therefore,
the "Mishneh Torah," or the "Second
Law," since it was only necessary to
read first the written Torah and then
this work in order to acquire the entire
body of the so-called "oral law." The
book contains all definitions of the Law
together with all traditional
explanations, statutes, and regulations,
as well as the traditions and
explanations of the Geonim and the
customs which were given, introduced, or
recognized from the time of Moses to the
conclusion of the Talmud (Preface to the
"Mishneh Torah"). It includes also the
ethical ideas, the moral teachings, and
the doctrinal principles which were
traditional or which had been
established by the sages or adopted by
general consent.
The "Mishneh Torah."
In the "Mishneh Torah" the commandments
of the Law are divided into fourteen
coherent groups. This forms the first
complete classification of the Mosaic
and rabbinical laws; each group
constitutes a book, and each book is
subdivided into sections, chapters, and
paragraphs.
The first book, called "Madda'"
(Knowledge), treats of the articles of
faith and such essential verities as the
unity of God and His incorporeality;
itdeals also with the study of the Law
and the prohibition against idolatry.
The second book contains the precepts
which must be observed at all times if
the love due to God is to be remembered
continually; wherefore it bears the name
of "Ahabah" (Love). The third book
discusses those laws which are limited
to certain times, such as the Sabbath
and the festivals, and is therefore
termed "Zemannim" (Times). The fourth
book, "Nashim" (Women), treats of
marriage laws. The fifth book contains
laws concerning forbidden sexual
relations and forbidden foods, and as
Israel was distinguished by these
commandments from the other nations and
was hallowed thereby, it bears the name
of "Kedushshah" (Holiness). The sixth
book is concerned with the law regarding
vows and oaths, and since he who makes a
vow is separated by his vow from others,
this section is called "Hafla'ah"
(Separation). The seventh book, "Zera'im"
(Seeds), treats of the laws and precepts
connected with agriculture. The eighth
book, "'Abodah" (Divine Service), is
concerned with regulations pertaining to
the Temple and its worship and the
offerings of the community. The ninth
book, "Korbanot" (Offerings), contains
laws for offerings, excepting those of
the whole community. The tenth book, "Tohorah"
(Cleanness), discusses the rules of
cleanness and uncleanness. The eleventh
book, "Nezikin" (Injuries), is concerned
with criminal law. The twelfth book, "Kinyan"
(Acquisition), is devoted to purchase
and sale; the thirteenth, "Mishpatim"
(Rights), to civil law; and the
fourteenth, "Shofetim" (Judges), to the
prescriptions concerning the
magistrates, the Sanhedrin, the king,
and the judges, as well as the duties
which they must fulfil and the
prerogatives which they enjoy.
His Sources.
The utmost brevity was sought by
Maimonides in his "Mishneh Torah," as in
his commentary on the Mishnah, and he
therefore continued his method of
avoiding citation, thinking it
sufficient to name in the preface the
works he had used, and the sages, links
in the chain of tradition, who had
transmitted the Law from Moses (Preface
to his "Sefer ha-Mizwot"). In addition
to the Babylonian Talmud, he drew upon
the Jerusalem Talmud, the halakic
midrashim, and the Sifra, Sifre, and
Mekilta. Therein he surpassed all his
predecessors, none of whom made so
extensive a use of the Jerusalem Talmud
and the halakic midrashim; he
occasionally preferred these works to
the Babylonian Talmud (comp. Malachi ha-Kohen
in "Yad Mal'aki," p. 184b; Weiss, l.c.
p. 232). These Talmudic and midrashic
works form the basis of most of the
material contained in this book without
special mention of the sources (Responsa,
No. 140).
One of the chief authorities of
Maimonides was the written Torah itself,
and there are many regulations and laws
contained in his work which are not
mentioned in Talmudic or midrashic
works, but which were deduced by him
through independent interpretations of
the Bible (comp. Abraham de Boton, "Leh.em
Mishneh" on "Yesode ha-Torah," ix. 1; "Yad
Mal'aki," Rule 4; Weiss, l.c. p. 231,
Note 234). The maxims and decisions of
the Geonim are frequently presented with
the introductory phrase "The Geonim have
decided" or "There is a regulation of
the Geonim," while the opinions of Isaac
Alfasi and Joseph ibn Migas are prefaced
by the words "My teachers have decided"
(comp. "Yad," She'elah, v. § 6; "Yad
Mal'aki," Rule 32). Maimonides likewise
refers to Spanish, French, and
Palestinian authorities, although he
does not name them, nor is it known to
whom he refers. He furthermore drew from
Gentile sources, and a great part of his
researches on the calendar, contained in
"Yad," Kiddush ha-H.odesh, was based
upon Greek theories and reckonings.
Since these rules rested upon sound
argument, he thought that it made no
difference whether an author was a
prophet or a Gentile (ib. xvii. 25). In
a like spirit he adopted principles of
Greek philosophy in the first book of
the "Mishneh Torah," although no
authority for these teachings was to be
found in Talmudic or midrashic
literature.
Omissions.
Maimonides did not surrender his
originality or his independent judgment
even when his views were in conflict
with those of all his authorities, for
it was impossible, in his opinion, to
renounce one's own reasons or to reject
recognized truths because of some
conflicting statements in the Talmud or
the Midrash. Thus he made a ruling on
his own authority and based upon his
medical knowledge without being able to
establish it by any statement of the
older authorities ("Yad," Sheh.itah,
viii. 23; comp. Responsa, No. 37,
addressed to the scholars of Lunel). He
likewise omitted many regulations
contained in the Talmud and Mishnah
because they did not coincide with his
views—e. g., those precepts which
depended on superstitious views or on
the belief in demons—and in a similar
spirit he passed over much that was
forbidden in the Talmud as injurious to
health, since his medical knowledge led
him to consider these things harmless.
In his choice of language, also,
Maimonides deviated from custom, being
averse to the Talmudic Aramaic, with its
mixture of many elements drawn from
other languages, since it was known only
to those who were specially interested
in it and had acquired it solely for the
pursuit of Talmudic studies (Preface to
the "Mishneh Torah"). He therefore
preferred to write in the later Hebrew
of the Mishnah, which was his precedent
also for his brevity, his avoidance of
discussions, and his scanty citations of
the sources from which he had drawn his
laws and his decisions.
Opposition of RABaD.
This great work of Maimonides was
bitterly attacked as soon as it
appeared, and from every side its author
was assailed with questions and
refutations. Many attacked the work from
mere envy and because of their failure
to understand certain things in it, and
accused the author of wishing to destroy
all study of the Talmud (Responsa, No.
140). He had, on the other hand, many
sincere opponents, one of the most
important being Abraham ben David of
Posquières. These antagonists were
especially bitter against the new
methods which he had employed, and the
very peculiarities which he had regarded
as merits in his work failed to please
his opponents simply because they were
innovations. Thus they reproached him
because he wrote in Hebrew instead of in
the customary Talmudic idiom (comp.
RABaD on "Yad," Shebu'ot, vi. 9);
because he departed from the Talmudic
order and introduced a division and
arrangement of his own (RABaD on "Yad,"
Nedarim, iii. 5, and on "Yad," Shofar,
ii. 8); because he dared to decide
according to the Tosefta and the
Jerusalem Talmud as against the
Babylonian (RABaD on "Yad," Ma'aser
Sheni, i. 8).
Maimonides' Reply.
Especially sharp was the blame heaped
upon Maimonides because he neglected to
cite his sources; this was considered an
evidence of his superciliousness (RABaD,
in his notes on the preface of
Maimonides), since it made it difficult,
if not absolutely impossible, for
scholars to verify his statements, and
compelled them to follow his decisions
absolutely (ib.). Maimonides, of course,
defended himself. He had not composed
this work for glory; he desired only to
supply the necessary but lacking code
(Letter to 'Aknin, p. 30b), for there
was danger lest pupils, weary of the
difficult study, might go astray in
decisions of practical importance
(Letter to Rabbi Jonathan of Lunel, in
which he thanks the latter for certain
corrections; Responsa, No. 49). It had
never been his intention, furthermore,
to abolish Talmudic studies, nor had he
ever said that there was no need of the
"Halakot" of Alfasi, for he himself had
lectured to his pupils on the Gemara
and, at their request, upon Alfasi's
work (Responsa, No. 140). His omission
of his sources was due solely to his
desire for brevity, although he
regretted that he had not written a
supplementary work citing his
authorities for those halakot whose
sources were not evident from the
context. He would, however, should
circumstances permit, atone for this
error, however toilsome it might be to
write such a supplement (Responsa, No.
140). RABaD was forced to acknowledge,
despite his attacks and refutations,
that the work of Maimonides was a
magnificent contribution (note on "Yad,"
Kilayim, vi. 2), nor did he hesitate to
praise him and approve his views in many
passages, citing and commenting upon the
sources (comp. Weiss, l.c. p. 259).
Influence of the "Yad."
Thus the work of Maimonides,
notwithstanding the sharp attacks upon
it, soon won general recognition as an
authority of the first importance for
ritual decisions. A decision might not
be rendered in opposition to a view of
Maimonides, even though the latter
apparently militated against the sense
of a Talmudic passage, for in such cases
the presumption was that the words of
the Talmud were incorrectly interpreted
("Yad Mal'aki," Rule 26, p. 186, cited
in the name of several authorities). One
must, in like manner, follow Maimonides
even when the latter opposed his
teachers, since he surely knew their
views, and if he decided against them he
must have disapproved their
interpretation (ib. Rule 27, cited in
the name of Samuel of Modena). Even when
later authorities, like Asher ben Jehiel,
decided against Maimonides, it became a
rule of the Oriental Jews to follow the
latter, although the European Jews,
especially the Ashkenazim, preferred the
opinions of Asheri in such cases (ib.
Rule 36, p. 190). But the hope which
Maimonides expressed in his letter to 'Aknin,
that in time to come his work and his
alone would be accepted, has been only
half fulfilled. His "Mishneh Torah" was
indeed very popular, but there was no
cessation in the study of other works,
with which his own had to endure
comparison.
The object which Maimonides had sought
in his "Mishneh Torah," the facilitation
of the study of the Talmud through
brevity and system, was not attained.
His words and expressions were regarded
as so precisely and accurately selected
that they were themselves treated as
carefully as the Talmud itself, and
became material for interpretation and
exegesis ("Yad Mal'aki," Rule 3). In
this manner every word and every
sentence of the "Mishneh Torah" was made
the object of repeated commentaries and
casuistic hermeneutics. As it had been
hitherto impossible to deduce any
decision from the Mishnah without a
knowledge of the involved discussions
and interpretations of the Talmud, so
now no ruling of full validity in
practise can be inferred from the "Mishneh
Torah" unless due regard is paid to the
commentaries upon this work, as well as
to their discussions, investigations,
and comparisons with other codes.
Bibliography: Geiger, Moses ben Maimon,
in Nachgelassene Schriften, iii. 34-96;
Malachi ha-Kohen, Yad Mal'aki, pp.
182a-187b, Przemysl, 1877;
Weiss, Tolcdot ha-RaMBaM, in Bet Talmud,
vol. i.;
idem, Dor, iv. 290-303.E. C. J. Z. L. |
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